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ACTIONS. See Association.
ARBITRATON. See Contract.
ASSIGNMENT. See Banks and Banking.
For Benefit of Creditors-Preference-Attorney,'s Fee-Concealment
of Assets-Demurer.-A provision in an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, directing the payment of a reasonable fee to the lawyer who
prepared the assignment for his services, is not an unlawful preference:
Verner v. Davis, 24 or 25 S. C.
Nor is the fact that the assignor has concealed a portion of his assets
alone sufficient, to justify setting aside the assignment: Id.
But while a bill to set aside the assignment would have been demur-
rable had it contained only the charge of the unlawful preference of the
lawyer, and the concealing of assets, yet as it further charged that " the
assignment was pretensive, illegal and void, and that the assignee had
abandoned his trust," the demurrer was properly overruled: Id.
ASSOCIATIONS.
Actions-Eguity- Trial before Committee- Waiver-Efect of Error.
I To appear in 121 U. S. Rep. 8 To appear in 42 or 43 N. J. Eq.
2 To appear in 67 or 68 Cal. Rep. Rep.
3 To appear in 6 or 7 Houston. 9 To appear in 95 or 96 N. C. Rep.
4 To appear in 79 or 80 Ae. Rep. 10 To appear in 114 or 115 Pa. St. Rep.
5 To appear in 143 or 144 Mfass. 11 To appear in 24 or 25 S. C. Rep.
Rep. 12 To appear in 66 or 67 Tex. Rep.
6 To appear in 59 or 60 Mich. Rep. 13 To appear in 66 or 67 Wis. Rep.
7 To appear in 64 or 65 N. H. Rep. " To appear in 81 or 82 Va. Rep.
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-A court of equity has jurisdiction of causes of action, within the con-
trol of the tribunals ordained by the constitution and by-laws of an
unincorporated society, only where some material irregularity in the pro-
ceedings is shown to have occurred which has not been waived by the
suitor : Appeal of Sperry, 114 or 115 Pa.
On the trial of a member of a lodge before a committee, an irregu-
larity in the appointment of the committee, under the by-laws, is waived
by the appearance of the accused, who having knowledge of the irregu-
larity does not object thereto : rd.
The exclusion of a competent witness, offered by the accused, on the
ground that he is incompetent, is a mistake of judgment, and not an
irregularity of procedure, the omission to complain of which, on appeal
to the lodge, is a waiver of such error: Id.
GREEN and TRUNKEY, JJ., dissenting.
ASSUPSIT. See Evidence.
ATTORNEY'S FEE. See Assignment.
BANKS AND BANKING.
Taxation- What is Taxable-Bank Stock.-Under Rev. St. Tex.,
art. 4682, exempting corporation stock from taxation against the owner
when the capital and property of the corporation are required to be
taxed, the owner of stock in a state bank is not taxable therewith while
the property of the bank is, under the law taxable, although the bank
does not return its property for taxation, as it should do : Gille.pie v.
Gaston, 66 or 67 Tex.
Banking Dividends-Surplus Profits.-A savings bank cannot ap-
propriate and pay as a dividend to its stockholders and depositors on the
profits arising from its business, any portion of the interest upon its loans
or investments that may have matured or accrued, but which have not
been actually collected and received in money. Money earned as in-
terest, however well secured or certain to be eventually paid, cannot in
fact be distributed as dividends to stockholders, and does not constitute
surplus profits within the meaning of the statute: The People v. San
Francisco Savings Union, 67 or 68 Cal.
Trusts-Assignment for Benefit of Creditors-Proof of Claim-
.Tj'idend.-A. sold land to B. and forwarded the deed and abstract of
title to a banker to be delivered to B. on payment of $2000, which was
to be immediately remitted to him. The banker delivered the deed to
B. on payment by him of four $100 bills, and certain certificates of de-
posit which the banker had previously issued to him and others. The
banker failed the same night, and before the $2000 had been remitted
to A. Held, that it was a fraud on A. for the banker to receive certifi-
cates instead of cash, and that the assets in the hands of his assignee
were impressed with a trust in favor of A. to the extent of $2000, and
that his claim for that amount should be paid in preference to all other
claims: Francis v. Evans, 66 or 67 Wis.
In such a case the fact that the creditor has proved his claim before
the assignee and received a dividend thereon, will not affect his right to
recover the whole amount due him, less such dividend, in an action
against the assignee : Id.
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Taxation on Shares of Stock-" Honeyed Capital"-Rev. Stat. U. S.
§ 5219-Discrimination-Bonds of Municipal Corporations.-The main
purpose of Congress in fixing limits to state taxation on investments in
shares of National Banks was, to render it impossible for the state, in
levying such a tax, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly com-
petition, by favoring institutions or individuals carrying on a similar
business, and operations and investments of like character: Mercantile
Bank v. N. Y., 121 U. S.
The term, " moneyed capital," as used in Rev. Stat. § 5219, respect-
ing state taxation of shares in national banks, embraces capital employed
in National Banks, and capital employed by individuals when the object
of their business is the making of profit by the use of their moneyed
capital as money-as in banking, as that business is defined in the opinion
of the court; but it does not include moneyed capital in the hands of
a corporation, even if its business be such as to make its shares moneyed
capital when in the hands of individuals, or if it invests its capital in
securities payable in money : Id.
The mode of taxation adopted by the state of New York in reference
to its corporations, excluding trust companies and savings banks, does
not operate in such a way as to make the tax assessed upon shares of
national banks at a greater rate than that imposed upon other moneyed.
capital in the hands of individual citizens: Id.
Although trust companies created under the laws of New York, are
not banks in the commercial sense of the word, shares in such com-
panies are moneyed capital in the hands of individuals: but as these
companies are taxed upon the value of their capital stock, with deduc-
tions on account of property in which it is invested, either otherwise
taxed or not taxable, and are additionally taxed upon their income, by
way of franchise tax, it does not appear that the rate of taxation thus
imposed by the laws of New York is less than that upon shares in na-
tional banks: Id.
Deposits in savings banks are exempted from state taxation, for just
reasons, and, as the exemption does not operate as an unfriendly discrim-
ination against investments in national bank shares, it cannot affect the
rule for the taxation of the latter : Id.
The amount of bonds of the city of New York, which are exenipt
from taxation under state laws, is too small, as compared with the whole
amount of personal property and credits which are the subject of tax-
ation, to affect, under Rev. Stat., § 5219, the validity of the assess-
ment : Id.
.The bonds of municipal corporations are not within the rule estab-
lished by Congress for the taxation of national banks: 1d.
CmmON CAauIER. See Contract.
CONTRACT.
For Arbitration- Vadity/.-An agreement in a deed that if any
controversy arise between the parties it shall be settled by an arbiter, is
invalid, as courts cannot be ousted of their jurisdiction by such agree-
ments: Dugan v. Thomas, 79 or 80 Me.
Validity- Gaming-i.llegal Purpose-Participation.-If money is
lent with the mere knowledge or belief on the part of the lender that
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it is to be used for gambling purposes, and without any participation on
his part in thd illegal act, an action cannot be maintained for its recovery:
Tyiier v. Carlisle, 79 or 80 Me.
Even if the lender participates in the purposes of the borrower, he
may recover the money of the borrower, if demanded before it has been
actually used. In minor offences the locus pcenitentiz continues until
the execution of the illegal act: Id.
.Master and Servant-Implied Assent.-The plaintiff, an employee of
the defendant, demanded an increase of wages to commence January 1st
1885, and gave due notice to defendant's agent that he would leave
unless such increase was made. The agent promised to give an answer
in two or three days, but failed to do so for several months, allowing the
plaintiff in the meanwhile to continue work. Thereupon plaintiff was
told that his salary would be increased as demanded, but to commence
May 1st 1885 : .eld, that the silence of the agent did not raise the
implication of assent on the part of the defendant, and that plaintiff was
not entitled to the increase for the time from January 1st to May 1st
1885: Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co., 24 or 25 S. C.
Breach of - Damages - Waiver of Claim - Carriers -Powers-
Affreightment of Vessels.-The Shippers' Compress Company entered
into a contract with the Virginia & Tennessee Air Line, an association
composed of the Norfolk & Western Railroad Company and other cor-
porations, by which the latter agreed to fill with cotton a certain amount
of room on board the steamers Liscard and Linhope, at the port of
Norfolk, said cotton to be placed on board on the 18th and 19th of October
1881, on which dates the steamers were to be loaded and made ready to
sail for Liverpool. .The cotton was not delivered until several days after
the time agreed upon, and, in consequence of the delay, the Shippers'
Compress Company was, by the terms of its charter-party, compelled to
pay a large sum for demurrage, after having given the proper agent of
the Virginia & Tennessee Air Line repeated and timely notice of the
consequences which would result from its failure to deliver the cotton in
time : Reid, that the subsequent acceptance of the cotton by the com-
press company was not a waiver of the stipulation as to time, and that
it could recover the amount of demurrage so paid in an action against
the Air Line : .Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Shippers' Compress Co., 81 or
82 Va.
Such a contract, made by a railroad corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of transporting merchandise, is not ultra vires, but properly inci-
dental to the purposes of its charter : Id.
CORPORATTONS.
Insolvency-Realization of Association.-Where the receiver of an
insolvent corporation has realized on all the assets except certain stocks,
bonds and real estate, which are for the time unmerehantable, and if
forced upon the market would be sacrificed, the court may, in view of
the desirability of closing the trust, direct the securities to be sold at
public auction, after full notice to all persons interested, at an upset
price, and in proper lots or parcels to invite buyers : In re Newark
Savings Inst., 42 or 43 N. J. Eq.
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COVENANTS.
Implied- Quiet Enjoyment-Party- Wall-Rent--The statutory right
common to all owners of real estate in Philadelphia, to use division
walls as party-walls, does not constitute a breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment implied in a lease; and if a leased dwelling-house in
Philadelphia is rendered uninhabitable by the adjoining proprietor ex-
ercising his right to pull down and rebuild the party-wall, such fact will
constitute no defence to an action for the rent: Barns v. Wilson, 114 or
115 Pa.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Sentence-Escape-Arrest.-Notwithstanding Code Del., p. 795, pro-
vides that, "when imprisonment is part of the sentence, the term shall
be fixed, and its commencement and ending specified," a prisoner who
escapes before his time is served, and remains at large until his term is
up, is liable to arrest for the purpose of carrying his sentence into'effect.
Such a case is governed by the maxim, nullus commodum capere potest
de injuria sua propria : .Mc6oy v. State, 6 or 7 Houston.
DAMAGES. See Contract.
DEED. See Evidence.
DELIVvRY. See Gift.
DEMURRER. See Assignment.
DOwER.
Right to-Receipt of Purchase Price-Recoupment.-A married
woman joined her husband in the execution of a bond, without her
privy examination, for title to land to be made upon payment of the
purchase-money. The purchaser executed notes to the husband for the
purehase-mon.ey, and delivered them to the wife, who received their
value, but who afterwards repudiated and disaffirmed her obligation, and
claimed dower. Held, that if the widow elects to claim dower, the pur-
chaser would have a right to such damages as he may sustain thereby:
Hodge v. Powell, 95 or 96 N. 0.
BASEMENT. See Waters and Watercourses.
EQUITY. See Associations.
EVIDENCE.
Assumpsit-Sealed lnstrument.-In assumpsit against a partnership
a sealed agreement executed by one of the partners, offered, not to prove
the contract, but merely to show the value of the goods, by showing
what defendant had agreed to pay, is admissible in evidence : Gallagher
v. Strobridge Lithographing Co, 114 or 115 Pa.
Ewxtrinsic-Deed.-In construing a deed of land, the description in
which is doubtful, the evidence competent to be considered is the
language of the deed, and the surrounding circumstances at the time
of its execution. including the situation of the parties, and the object
they had in view: Elliott v. Gilchrist, 64 or 65 N. H.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Waste- Co-Executors-Joint Receipt.-W., one of two executors, is
not rendered liable for the devastavit of N., his co-executor, by the fact
that he joined in the receipt given for the money wasted, where, with
respect to that part of the estate, no express trust duties were enjoined
by the will, and W., before consenting to the exercise of sole control
over the fund by N., took the advice of counsel upon the subject, and
exacted of N. an acknowledgment of his sole liability, which he had no
reason to doubt was good because of N.'s financial responsibility : Wil-
son's Appeal, 114 or 115 Pa.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.
What Constitutes Forcible Entry/.-Thc testimony of a prosecutor, in
part corroborated by his wife, that he found defendants standing on his
property clearing a ditch that separated it from the adjoining premises,
and that upon his ordering them to leave they chased him to within a
short distance of his house, is sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty
of forcible entry: State v. Talbot, 95 or 96 N. 0.
GAMING. See Contract.
GIFT.
Inter Vivos-Delivery.-A gift of personal property from father to
son, to be valid, must be accompanied by delivery. And the delivery
must be actual, so far as the subject of the gift, in its nature, is capable
of delivery: Medlock v. Powell, 95 or 96 N. 0.
In an action to recover possession of a mule, the evidence showed that
plaintiff's father had said to him he might have a colt if he would raise
it. After that, plaintiff claimed the colt, but it remained with his
father's horses, and was fed with them. The father, with the consent
of the plaintiff, exchanged the colt for the mule in controversy. The
plaintiff claimed it, and used it when he saw fit, and also received hire
for it. The father left home, and took the mule with him, and kept it
for several years. Testimony was given that the father had stated to
several persons that the mule was his son's, and that members of the
family understood that it belonged to him. Held, that there was no
evidence to show delivery, and that the plaintiff could not recover : Id.
HUgBAND AND WIFE. See Witness.
INJUNCTION. See Waste.
INSOLVENCY. See C oration.
INSURANCE.
L.fe-Insurable Interest.-A., an old woman, was living with her
daughter and B., the father of her son-in-law. B. had A.'s life insured;
his only interest being, as stated in the application, "has kept her for
a certain length of time, and promises to keep her as long as she lives."
After the death of A., her executor attempted to recover the amount of
the policy from B., less the amounts paid by him. The court, on the
trial, refused to charge the jury, as matter of law, that the insurance
was speculative. Beld not be error: Batdorfv. Fehler, 114 or 115 Pa.
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Life-Tra.sfer of Poliqt-Trust.-A policy of insurance was issued
upon the life of A., for the benefit of A.'s mother, who, together with
A.'s sister, furnished the money to pay the first premium. A., at the
time the policy was issued, was unmarried. After several premiums had
been paid A., who had in the mean time married, surrendered the
policy, (which had been in his possession all the time, although he had
shown it to his mother, and told her that it had been taken out for her
benefit,) and without the knowledge of A.'s mother a new one was
issued, payable to A.'s wife, it being stated that the new policy was a
continuation of the old one. Under the terms of the policy, after two
full premiums had been paid, certain valuable rights under it accrued
to the person for whose benefit it had been taken out. Beld, upon the
death of A., that a trust had been created in favor of the mother, and
that A. not having reserved a power of revocation in the first policy, a
transfer to the wife could not be made without the consent of the
mother : Pingrey v. Rational Lf/e Ins. Co., 143 or 144 Mass.
Life-Death by Act of Third Person- Unlawful Act.-U., a minor
who had enlisted, deserted from the army, and was shot by an under-
sheriff, who attempted to arrest him. There was a conflict of evidence
on the point as to whether the officer knew at the time of the shooting
that the party shot was the deserter, and also as to whether the killing
was in self-defence. Eeld that, if the officer did not know that the
person he fired at was U., and did not intend to kill U., it could not be
said, as matter of law, that U. lost his life by the design of the officer,
within the meaning of an accident policy insuring U., which provided
that "the insurance should not extend to any case of death or personal
injury lunless the claimant establish, by direct and positive proof, that
the death or injury was caused by external violence and accidental
means, and was not the result of design, either on the part of deceased,
or any other person," and that the case should be submitted to the jury:
Utter v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 59 or 60 Mich.
Where a person who is insured deserts from the army, and is shot by
a sheriff, who is attempting to arrest him, as alleged in self-defence, it
cannot be held, as matter of law, that he was engaged in an unlawful
act, within the meaning of a policy of accident insurance, providing that
no claim shall be made " when the death or injury may have happened
* * * while engaged in or in consequence of any unlawful act :" Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Covenants.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Contracts.
MORTGAGE. See Waste.
Chattel - Foreclosure - Pleading -Receiver-Sale.-A motion to
strike out a bill to foreclose a chattel mortgage cannot be sustained on
the ground of want of proper parties, if the notice does not point out
who should be made parties; nor on the ground that the goods and
chattels are not properly described, when many of the goods are partic-
ularly described ; nor on the ground that the bill includes goods not
included in the mortgage, that being matter of evidence ; nor because
the bill does not describe all the goods now in defendant's store, the
bill only asking to foreclose the equity of redemption of the goods
which are described: Howell v. Frances, 42 or 43 N. J. Eq.
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A receiver appointed in a suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage, held
properly ordeied to sell horses claimed to be included in the mortgage as
perishable property: Id.
Release of-Setting Aside.-The release of a mortgage, in considera-
tion of the mortgagor's quit claim deed of the land, may be set aside
when the deed does not include all the land mortgaged, and the mort-
gagee was deceived in supposing it did without fault on his part: Elli-
ott v. Gilchrist, 64 or 65 N. H.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Banks and Banking.
NUISAN0E.
Party who Perpetrates is Responsible.-A. created a nuisance on cer-
tain premises, and then demised the same to B. Thereafter, C., (de-
fendant), with full knowledge of the nuisance and of the tenancy, pur-
chased the reversion, and received the rent from the tenant, who
attorned to it, and during this state of things plaintiff sustained the
damage for which he had verdict and judgment. Held, he, who, with
full knowledge of the existence of a nuisance upon real estate for which
the owner would be liable, purchases the reversionary interest in such
real estate, and receives the rents thereof from the tenants in possession,
thereby voluntarily assumes the responsibility of such nuisance, and
becomes liable for the damages sustained in consequence thereof, subse-
quent to his purchase: Rievee v. German Savings and Loan Society,
67 or 68 Cal.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. See Witness.
RAIROADS.
Negligence-Contribuory-Railroad Crossing-Evidence-Duty of
Traveller-Duty of Company-Signals-Speed-Train behind Time-
View of Track- Obstructions.-The plaintiff's intestate was killed by
a train of the defendant while crossing the tracks over the main street
in a village of about 4000 inhabitants. At the time of the accident he
was driving slowly in a democrat wagon, drawn by a mule which was so
slow and lazy that it was a common practice to joke about the mule, and
tell his driver to whip up. When about to cross, persons 'Who saw the
train coming called to the decedent to whip up, but it did not appear
that he understood that the train was approaching. The decedent looked
and listened as he drew near the crossing, but did not stop. The train
that killed him was two hours late, and was running from twenty.five to
forty miles an hour. There was no flagman at the crossing, and the
view was obstructed by coal-bunkers and standing freight cars. There
was a preponderance of evidence for the plaintiff that no bell was rung
or whistle sounded. Reid, that the decedent was not guilty of contri-
butory negligence and could recover: Guggenheim v. Lake Shore & H.
S. Rd., 59 or 60 Mich.
Where it is the custom of a daily train to sound a whistle and ring a
bell when approaching a certain street crossing, a person driving in a
wagon along the street, two hours after the schedule time of the train,
is not bound, because the track at the crossing is obstructed so that he
cannot see beyond, to get down from his vehicle, and go to a point where
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he can see before driving over the crossing: if he looks and listens care-
fully, that is all that can be required of him under such circumstances:
Id.
The absence of a statute regulating the speed of trains, and of an
ordinance requiring them to give signals of their approach to a street
crossing, does not exempt the railroad company from due care with re-
spect to speed, and from the duty of giving warning, either by bell,
whistle, or both, or by some other means, where the street crossed is the
main thoroughfare of a village of 4000 inhabitants, and where the view
of travellers on the street is obstructed by buildings and standing freight
cars near the crossing : Id.
It is not negligence ver se for a train to be behind time; but the fact
that it is off time increases and- heightens the duties resting upon the
company to give such additional warnings of its approach to a street
crossing as will enable persons in the street, who are not aware that it is
off time, opportunity to guard against the danger more carefully than
they would from regular trains, running on schedule time: Id.
While a railroad company is not guilty of negligence in leaving its
freight cars standing on a side track near a street crossing, yet when
they are so placed as to cut off the view of approaching trains, and
make it more difficult for persons going over the tracks to see the ap-
proach of trains, such placing of the cars imposes upon it the additional
duty of giving such additional warning as the danger thus increased
may require: 
Id.
REcOUPMENT. See Dower.
STATuTE. See Banks and Banking.
TAX. See Banks and Banking.
TRUSTS. See Banks and Banking; Insurance.
Use of Funds by Trustee-Right of Beneficary.-A husband who
was trustee of his wife's separate estate used a large part of the funds
to erect a row of tenement houses on a city lot owned by himself. He
then executed a "declaration of trust ;" reciting the facts and the
advisability of substituting the property for the trust funds, and set-
ting out that the lot with the buildings thereon were held by him under
the trust. The houses were destroyed by fire. From the material left
the trustee erected a house for his wife and himself, which they oceu-
pied until his death, and which the widow used afterwards as her home.
'The trustee died insolvent: Held, in a suit by a creditor of the husband
to subject the house and lot to his debt, that the investment was unau-
thorized, that the trust fund could be followed; and that the beneficiary
having elected to take the property instead of a charge upon it, it was
her property, and not that of the trustee: Brazel v. Fair, 25 or 26 S. 0.
WAIVER. See Associations; Contract.
WASTE. See .Ekeecutors and Administrators.
Mortgage-Digging up and Selling Soil-Injunction.-A. filed a bill
in equity alleging that he had sold certain land to B., taking a mortgage
for the whole of the purchase-money; that the understanding between
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the parties was that the land was to be sold out in lots for building pur-
poses; that, instead of doing so, B. was selling the soil of the land, and
had opened sand and stone quarries, and was disposing of the sand and
stone thereon ; that, by reason of this waste, the security of his mort-
gage was lessened ; and prayed for an injunction to stay this waste. A.
supported the allegations of his bill by numerous affidavits. B., in
counter-affidavits, alleged that he was not quarrying the land with the
intention of committing waste, but that he was merely grading the same,
in order to make it more suitable to dispose of in building lots. The
court, having found the facts as alleged by A., granted the injunction ;
Held, on the facts so found, there was no error in the decree : Martin's
Appeal, 114 or 115 Pa.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
Riparian Rights-Artificial C'hannel.-The owner of lands upon
which there was a lagoon, from which there was no natural outlet, cut
a ditch for irrigating purposes. Thereafter he conveyed part of the
land upon which the lagoon was situated to the defendants. He con-
veyed the remainder of his lands to the plaintiffs. The irrigating ditch
ran between the different tracts conveyed. By parol permission of their
grantor (the defendants), the plaintiffs had used the waste waters of the
ditch: Held, that the water never having flowed in any natural channel,
the plaintiffs never acquired any riparian rights in the flow of water in
the ditch : Green v. Carotto, 67 or 68 Cal.
Sea hore-Right to Fish.-An action of tort cannot be maintained
for passing over the shore and flats, below high-water mark, for the pur-
pose of fishing, and for fishing therefrom, where the shore has not been
enclosed by the prdprietor, and the defendant has not created any per-
manent obstruction - Packer v. Ryder, 143 or 144 Mass.
.Easement-Mill-Dam.-A. purchased a mill property knowing that
to operate the mill profitably he would have to increase the water-power,
and proceeded to acquire rights from various land-owners whose lands
would be overflowed by raising his dam, but made no agreement for pay-
ment of damages with B., whose lands were seriously damaged by the
increased overflow. B. knew of the raising of the dam, and that his
land would be overflowed, but did not know to what extent it would be
damaged, and he made no objection, and allowed his minor sons to work
for A. in making the improvement. Subsequently B. sought to enjoin
A. from raising the water higher than in the old dam, and to compel him
to reduc6 the height of the new dam: field, that while B. was entitled
to compensation for the damages sustained by him, he was not entitled
to the relief asked, because of his own acquiescence in the raising of the
dam, and failure to object thereto: Blake v. Cornwell, 59 or 60 Mich.
WITNEss.
Privileged Communicaton-Husband and Wife.-A divorced wife can-
not testify to confidential communications between her and her husband
made during the existence of the marriage relation : Brock v. Brock,
114 or 115 Pa.
